The new vocabulary in the Defence industry circles, such as, in vogue, Grey Zones activities, has highlighted the changing attitudes by Defence personnel culture to the National Security environment and the considered imminent threats to Australian National Security. Not surprisingly, China remains the most likely source for both considered imminent direct threat, ie, within the South China Sea theatre, to Australian and Regional Security concerns. The grey zone activities is exemplified with the purported cybersecurity classified breaches to Australian Government service provisions according to unsubstantiated allegations by the Australian Government which seem to inadvertently pointing the finger almost directly at the Chinese Government. Not surprisingly, not only has the Chinese Government flatly refute all allegations by the Australian Government but would also go on to consider Australia as an uncooperative trading partners in matters in the interest of the Chinese Government.
Moreover, the current Australian Government’s Defence Department posture has been considered as overtly anti-China with the current Operation Gateway Naval and Air Force surveillance and monitoring activities by the Australian Defence Force.
The $270Billion Defence Budget investment, unprecedentedly, has been earmarked, mostly, on a Missile Defence Strategy, which may be focused on the Hypersonic Missile defense system.
The primary strategy of the Australian Layered Missile Defense System, seemed to have echoed a Reagan-like era, or the Star Wars Continental Missile Defense Strategy. According to Defence Connect, the Australian version of the layered missile defence strategy is,
“… the acquisition of key platforms like the recently announced National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) as part of the $2 billion LAND 19 Phase 7B program, combined with the Aegis SPY-1D radars aboard the Hobart and Hunter Class vessels, establish the basis for a layered-national missile defence capability.
Building on these capabilities, AIR 6500 has been conceptualised as a 'system-of-systems' combining the data gathering, analysis and firing solutions of inter-service platforms like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, E-7A Wedgetail, P-8A Poseidon, Hobart Class and Hunter Class and the NASAMS.
AIR 6500 is a joint battle management system that will interconnect the many disparate platforms, systems and sensors across the air, land space, electromagnetic and cyber domains into a collaborative environment that provides shared situational awareness of the battlespace and the ability to rapidly plan responses to threats”. (Kuper, S, Defence Connect, 18th April, 2019)
(Defence Connect)
The tiered level of the Continental Missile Defence Strategy would illustrate the proximity of probable threats from missile at varying ranges threatening the Australian continent directly.
• Tactical: Designed to counter short-range, tactical ballistic missiles designed to travel less than 1.5km/s. Tactical anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) typically have short ranges, from 20-80 kilometres, and are designed to provide area defence for major infrastructure including cities, ports, airfields and forward-deployed military bases. Currently fielded defence systems include the US MIM-104 Patriot, Israeli Iron Dome and Russian S-300V systems.
• Theatre: Countering medium-to-intermediate range missiles designed to travel at approximately 3km/s providing defensive coverage across a localised region of military operations (typically a radius of several hundred kilometres). Currently fielded systems include the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), Israeli Arrow and Russian S-400 systems.
• Strategic: Designed to counter long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of travelling at approximately at 7km/s. These systems rely on a complex series of sensors, targeting computers and anti-ballistic missile systems to counter threats. Current examples include the Russian A-135 system responsible for the defence of Moscow and the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defence system responsible for defending the continental US from missiles launched in Asia. (Kuper,S Defence Connect, 18th April, 2019).
Overall, the Australian Reagan-like Strategic Defence Initiative seems to be rather ambitious for a middle power having to defend a 4,000 nautical mile coastline with a few ships and 12 conventionally powered submarines, and a over the horizon radar system that relies on a contingencies of AWACs air surveillance aircrafts to monitor the Australian coastlines primarily for Suspected Irregular Entry Vessels (or SIEVs). Otherwise, known as, refugee boats.
The Grey Zone activities seems to be even more pervasive and difficult to isolate and to assert appropriate counter measures due to the asymmetrical levels of socio-political and ubiquitous infiltration across varying platforms, from social media platforms, government websites, classified and encrypted cyber security infiltration which has been very difficult to isolate the most likely source of the attacks. Political campaign influences has been a case in point, e-commerce platforms, government elections, Government service provision websites and so on. Countering these Grey Zone activities such as cyberattacks are difficult to proffer countermeasures, due to the morphing capabilities of the various internet platforms.
The Australian National Security paradigm shift has acknowledge the Grey Zone activities which is considered as the asymmetrical conflict over the dubious ubiquitous world of the internet, and cyberspace, which is only limited by the stretch of the imagination and the limitations of resources at the disposal of those who initiate these initiatives and the counter measures to thwart these attacks to the Australian National Security interests.
With the current global pandemic, impinging on the Health security of most Nations in the world, it seems that that the Australian National Security Matters, particularly with regards to the National Health Security concerns for the Nation, seems even more urgent now than ever.
The current Defensive budget expenditure on the traditional Defense Material procurements seem to be subsumed by the more pressing and ever increasing scale and concerns on the Grey Zone activities, which may, invariably, include the global spread of pandemics, including the current COVID 19 pandemic.
Tim Tufuga
Sources:
Australian Government, Department of Defence, https://www.defence.gov.au/strategicupdate-2020/
Australian Government, Department of Defence, https://www.defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/docs/2020_Force_Structure_Plan.pdf
Australian Government, Department of Defence, https://www.defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/docs/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf
Barker, G, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-new-defence-paradigm/ 7th July, 2020.
Kuper, S, Defence Connect, https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/3925-the-layers-of-modern-missile-defence 19th April, 2019.
McLaughlin, A, ADBR, https://adbr.com.au/land-19-phase-7b-progresses-to-gate-2-with-the-enhanced-nasams/ 25th March, 2020.
Wikipedia.com, SIEVs, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suspected_Irregular_Entry_Vessel
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